INFORMATION

Psicothema was founded in Asturias (northern Spain) in 1989, and is published jointly by the Psychology Faculty of the University of Oviedo and the Psychological Association of the Principality of Asturias (Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos del Principado de Asturias).
We currently publish four issues per year, which accounts for some 100 articles annually. We admit work from both the basic and applied research fields, and from all areas of Psychology, all manuscripts being anonymously reviewed prior to publication.

PSICOTHEMA
  • Director: José Muñiz
  • Frequency:
         February | May | August | November
  • ISSN: 0214-9915
  • Digital Edition:: 1886-144X
CONTACT US
  • Address: Ildelfonso Sánchez del Río, 4, 1º B
    33001 Oviedo (Spain)
  • Phone: 985 285 778
  • Fax: 985 281 374
  • Email:psicothema@cop.es

Do people detect deception the way they think they do? Replication and extensions

Nuria Sánchez and Jaume Masip

University of Salamanca

Background: Research shows that people believe deception can be detected from behavioral cues despite their past experience of detecting lies from non-behavioral, contextual information (evidence, third-person reports, etc.). However, in previous research, the question about beliefs was necessarily general, while the question about revealing information was always about a specific lie. In this study, we addressed this problem. Method: Participants first indicated how they believed lies can be detected (beliefs; Questionnaire 1 or Q1). Next, they described either how they, in their past, detected a specific lie, several lies, or how they, in general, detect lies in their everyday lives (revealing information; Q2). Results: Regardless of the focus of Q2, and in line with prior research, behavioral cues were reported less often, and contextual indicators more often, in responding to Q2 than in responding to Q1. However, contrary to prior findings, behavioral cues still predominated in the responses to Q2. Conclusions: We found no evidence that the specific-vs.-general focus of the questions changed the pattern of results, which apparently depended solely on whether participants reported beliefs or revealing information. We provide explanations for the prevalence of behavioral cues in Q2 responses, and make suggestions for future research.

¿La gente detecta las mentiras tal como cree que lo hace? Replicación y ampliaciones. Antecedentes: la investigación muestra que las personas creen que la mentira se detecta a partir de claves conductuales pese a haber detectado mentiras en el pasado a partir de información contextual (evidencias, información de terceros...). En dicha investigación previa, la pregunta sobre creencias ha sido general, mientras que la referente a información reveladora ha sido sobre una mentira concreta. Este estudio resuelve este problema. Método: los participantes indicaron cómo creían que se pueden detectar mentiras (creencias; Cuestionario 1 o C1). Luego describieron cómo, en el pasado, habían descubierto una mentira, varias mentiras, o cómo, en general, suelen detectar mentiras en su vida cotidiana (información reveladora; C2). Resultados: independientemente de la modalidad de C2, y en línea con la investigación previa, las claves conductuales se mencionaron menos, y los indicadores contextuales más, al responder a C2 que a C1. Sin embargo, se mencionaron más indicios conductuales que contextuales incluso en C2. Conclusiones: no hallamos evidencia de que el foco específico o general de las preguntas cambiara el patrón de resultados, que al parecer dependió solo de si se mencionaban creencias o información reveladora. Ofrecemos explicaciones para la prevalencia de claves conductuales en C2 y hacemos sugerencias para la investigación futura.

PDF

Impact factor 2021:   JCR (WOS): 3.890 (Q1)   |   SJR (Scopus) : 1.308 (Q1)    |  CiteScore 2020: 5,3